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Epiphenomenal Properties 
Umut Baysan 
Abstract: What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled 
before we get to decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In 
this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. 
From this, I derive a characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I 
then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal 
because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, 
and these similarities figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties. 
Keywords: causal powers; epiphenomenal properties; higher-level causation; laws of 
nature; physicalism; realization 
1. Introduction 
It is sometimes argued that if higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences 
are not identical with physical properties, they must be epiphenomenal (e.g., Kim [1998]). But 
what is an epiphenomenal property? The short answer is that it is a property without any 
causal power. But what is it for a property not to have any causal power? To answer that, we 
should first decide what it is for a property to have some causal power. This paper argues that 
a property can be said to have a causal power insofar as it is lawfully necessitated that its 
bearers have that power. I call this ‘the nomic bearers thesis’ (NBT). Using NBT, I offer a 
characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property, and then discuss whether higher-
level properties are epiphenomenal.  
In section 2, I clarify my uses of the terms ‘property’, ‘power’, and ‘cause’. In section 3, I 
introduce the problem of epiphenomenal properties. In section 4, I explore a number of ways 
of explaining the relationship between properties and the causal powers associated with them, 
and then argue that NBT gives the best explanation. In section 5, I defend NBT from an 
objection based on nomologically coextensional properties. In section 6, I show NBT’s 
application on the issue of epiphenomenal properties, and argue that physically realized 
higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal. 
2. Property, Power and Cause 
Let me begin with three clarifications. The first one is about properties. Since my purposes 
here are to regiment the notion of an epiphenomenal property and solve a problem about 
higher-level properties, I shall assume, without argument, a broadly realist position about 
properties. I take it that a red chaise longue has the property of being red and a corkscrew has 
the property of being a corkscrew.1 More importantly, I use the term ‘property’ to refer to 
types, rather than tokens. John’s pain yesterday at 3pm is not a property in this use of 
‘property’; it is a token of the type being in pain, which has other tokens, e.g., Julie’s pain this 
afternoon. I am neither endorsing nor rejecting realism about universals. I hold that if there 
are universals, properties are universals; if there are none, properties must be identical with 
sets of ontologically more acceptable entities, such as tropes [Williams 1953] or resembling 
                                                 
1 I will use italics for property names. 
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(possible) objects [Lewis 1986; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002]. Most of what I have to say here 
should be acceptable regardless of where one stands regarding the debate on universals.  
In my use of the relevant terms, then we should contrast properties with their instances, which 
are particulars. I shall talk about a specific case of the instantiation relation, namely the 
bearing relation. Bearing is restricted to cases where the instantiating entity (i.e., the bearer) is 
a concrete particular, e.g., an ordinary physical object such as a pasta bowl, and the 
instantiated entity is a property, be it a universal or a nominalistically acceptable substitute for 
it. 
The second clarification is about powers. Some philosophers reserve the term ‘power’ for 
essentially dispositional natural properties [Contessa 2015; Bird 2016]. Whether there are any 
such properties can be contested, and I will not take a stance on this issue here. I use the terms 
‘power’, ‘causal power’, and ‘disposition’ interchangeably. In my use of these terms, 
saying/believing that some object has a causal power or a disposition is roughly 
saying/believing that a certain dispositional expression about that object is true. What makes a 
true dispositional expression about a particular object (e.g., ‘This vase is fragile’) true is an 
issue which I will not address.  
The third clarification is about causes. I am not in a position to offer a definition of ‘cause’. 
Likewise, I will not assume any particular theory of causation. I assume that some statements 
of the form ‘A is a cause of B’ are true, and providing an account that lays out the conditions 
under which such statements are true is outside my remit. Whereas some discussions of the 
issue of epiphenomenal properties in the special sciences offer particular theories of 
causation, some do not. This paper belongs to latter group.  
3. Powers of Properties 
Some have thought that within a broadly physicalist framework, higher-level properties must 
be identical with (reducible to) physical properties in order to keep their causal efficacy. For 
example, Kim [1998] has argued that if higher-level properties are not identical with physical 
properties, then either (i) they are epiphenomenal because, barring systematic causal 
overdetermination, all the causal work they are meant to do is already carried out by physical 
properties, or (ii) their causal powers imply the failure of the causal closure of the physical, 
i.e., the thesis that every physical effect has a physical cause. The problem with (i) is that it is 
counterintuitive, as it implies that the causal explanations we find in the sciences that invoke 
higher-level properties as causes are systematically mistaken. The problem with (ii) is that it 
is in tension with the broadly physicalist framework that is assumed from the outset. It 
particularly suggests that higher-level properties are ‘emergent’ properties with novel causal 
powers. So, the argument goes, higher-level properties must be identified with physical 
properties. 
One of the many responses to this line of reasoning has been to suggest that if higher-level 
properties have only some of the causal powers of the lower-level physical properties that 
underlie them, then they can be shown to be non-epiphenomenal without thereby being 
identified with physical properties or rendered emergent [Wilson 1999; Shoemaker 2001; 
Clapp 2001]. This is known as ‘the subset strategy’ for suggesting that any physically 
acceptable higher-level property has a subset of the causal powers of the lower-level physical 
property it depends on for its instantiation. 
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I will offer my own solution to the problem of epiphenomenal properties in section 6. For 
now, I only want to stress the role of the relationship between properties and causal powers in 
the forgoing discussion. Epiphenomenal properties are thought to be problematic in not 
having causal powers. Emergent properties are said to be distinctive because of having novel 
causal powers. Physically acceptable higher-level properties are claimed to have a subset of 
the causal powers of their physical base properties. What is common to these claims is the 
apparent presupposition that it is admissible to talk as if a property is the sort of entity that 
may have causal powers.  
4. Powers of Bearers  
What is it for a property to have a causal power? A very quick answer to this is that properties 
are abstract entities, hence they don’t have causal powers. As explained in section 2, I take 
properties to be either universals or sets of particulars. Since both universals and sets are 
abstract entities, it is uncontroversial that, in my use of ‘property’, properties are abstract 
entities. So, are all properties epiphenomenal? Surely, this is not the sense in which a property 
should count as epiphenomenal; something must have gone wrong. My diagnosis is that the 
claim that properties don’t have causal powers can be weakened to allow for a real-derivative 
distinction regarding the uses of ‘have’. According to this diagnosis, properties don’t really 
have causal powers, but there is a derivative sense in which they do.2 Consider the following 
two statements: 
Red-red (RR): Being red has the causal power to generate reddish visual experiences 
(in normal perceivers under normal viewing conditions).3 
Green-red (GR): Being green has the causal power to generate reddish visual 
experiences.  
Although, both RR and GR are strictly speaking false (because properties don’t really have 
causal powers), there is a sense in which RR is acceptable and GR is not. There is some 
relation that relates being red to things that really have the said power, and that relation 
doesn’t relate being green to things that really have that power. This relation is the bearing 
relation. Regarding RR: being red doesn’t really have the power to generate reddish visual 
experiences, but the bearers of being red have this power. Regarding GR: neither being green 
nor the bearers of being green have this power. These considerations support what I shall call 
the Bearers Thesis (BT): 
(BT): Properties don’t really have causal powers; their bearers do. In a derivative 
sense, we can say that a property F has a causal power C insofar as C can be rightly 
attributed to bearers of F. 
What BT offers is in line with the common understanding that property instances (not 
properties themselves) are the relata of causal relations. A property can be a cause 
derivatively on its instances’ being really causes. Given that property instances have property 
bearers as constituents, in cases where property instances are causes, the bearers in question 
                                                 
2 As also suggested, though without an argument, in Baysan [2016: 386]. 
3 Henceforth, I will drop this qualification in parentheses, but it remains implied. 
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have, and manifest, causal powers. So, the right way to make sense of power attributions to 
properties is by means of understanding them as power attributions to the bearers of these 
properties. An important issue here is to decide which bearers of a property we should take 
into account, and for this, we must consider more specific versions of BT.  
Before examining different versions of BT, I should mention two alternative strategies which 
I will not endorse. The first one is to appeal to the conferral relation that is supposed to relate 
properties, objects and causal powers.4 Properties don’t have causal powers; they confer 
causal powers on objects. Although I can be persuaded that ‘confer’ is a better verb than 
‘have’ for this usage, what is problematic with this strategy is that appealing to conferral 
doesn’t explain anything. We are trying to explain what underlies the connection between 
properties and the causal powers that are rightly associated with them. Saying that properties 
confer these causal powers is nothing but giving a name to what needs to be explained. The 
second alternative strategy is to say that properties don’t have powers but they are powers 
[Mumford 2008]. If all properties in one’s ontology are dispositional properties, then one can 
use this strategy. I am searching for a more neutral way of explaining the relationship between 
properties and the causal powers that are associated with them, so I will not appeal to this 
strategy. Nevertheless, what I will offer is compatible with the view that properties are 
powers.  
Now let’s start exploring variations on BT. If the proposal is that properties don’t really have 
causal powers but they do so derivatively on the powers of their bearers, then the next step is 
to decide which bearers we must consider. Remember the example about the property of 
being red and the causal power of generating reddish visual experiences (henceforth, the 
power to look red). What we might say is that being red has the power to look red because the 
bearers of this property (i.e., red objects) have the power to look red in virtue of being red. 
More generally: 
The Bearers Thesis – ‘in virtue of’ (BTV): A property F has a causal power C if and 
only if all bearers of F (that have C) have C in virtue of having F. 
I anticipate that BTV will win the hearts of many, in particular those who are moved by the 
theoretical benefits of using the locution ‘in virtue of’. But there are two reasons why I don’t 
find BTV very satisfying. First, by making this ‘in virtue of’ claim, we are explaining only 
very little of what needs to be explained. We are only saying that if a property F has some 
causal power, there is some explanation of this which involves F’s bearers and their causal 
powers. Put this way, there isn’t much to disagree with BTV, but I am hoping to make better 
progress and fill in what that explanation might be.  
Second, BTV presupposes that objects have their causal powers in virtue of their properties. If 
this is read one way, it implies that a property is a more fundamental entity than a causal 
power. This is a substantial metaphysical claim about properties and causal powers which can 
be contested. For example, some hold that properties are constituted by causal powers 
[Shoemaker 1980], which would indicate that a property is less fundamental than the causal 
powers that are associated with it. In such a view, it is more natural to think that an object has 
                                                 
4 See Contessa [2015] for a recent example of the use of ‘confer’. Also, sometimes ‘bestow’ and 
‘contribute’ are used to convey the same idea (see Shoemaker [1980]). 
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its properties in virtue of its causal powers.5 In response to this, it can be argued that the ‘in 
virtue of’ locution can be read in a way that doesn’t indicate a direction of fundamentality. In 
a sense, my car’s steering wheel is in the garage in virtue of my car’s being in the garage, but 
this doesn’t imply that my car’s presence is more fundamental than its steering wheel’s 
presence.6 I agree that there is a sensible way of reading some ‘in virtue of’ claims this way. 
However, if BTV is meant to give a metaphysical explanation of how properties have causal 
powers, arguably, the ‘in virtue of’ locution it invokes should be understood in a more 
restricted sense. In any case, the fact that there is this ambiguity about the use of ‘in virtue of’ 
adds to my scepticism about the usefulness of BTV. 
Maybe we should drop the in-virtue-of claim and say that the property of being red has the 
causal power to look red because all red objects have this power. On this proposal, we are 
supposed to consider the extension of a property in order to identify a property’s causal 
powers. If everything in being red’s extension has the power to look red, then (and only then) 
the property can be said to have this power. More generally: 
The Extensional Bearers Thesis (EBT): A property F has a causal power C if and only 
if all bearers of F have C. 
The problem with EBT is that it makes the relationship between properties and causal powers 
too contingent. Suppose that somehow all red objects are either destroyed or discoloured with 
one exception: a fire extinguisher Fred.7 As a fire extinguisher, Fred has the causal power to 
put out fire. Given that Fred is the only bearer of being red, EBT has the undesirable 
consequence that being red has the causal power to put out fire. But it shouldn’t be contingent 
on the destruction or discolouring of all red objects except one for the property of being red to 
acquire a new power. So, EBT needs fixing. 
If too much contingency is the problem, then the solution must be to make the right-hand side 
of the biconditional a modal claim. We could say that the property of being red has the causal 
power to look red because it is necessary that all bearers of being red have this power. Even 
in the scenario where Fred is the only red object, being red doesn’t have the power to put out 
fire because it is not necessary that all bearers of being red have this power; there could have 
been a highly flammable red blanket which wouldn’t have the power to put out fire. So, 
consider: 
                                                 
5 It might be proposed that we can modify BTV as follows: a property F has a causal power C if and 
only if either (i) bearers of F (that have C) have C in virtue of having F or (ii) bearers of F (that have 
C) have F in virtue of having C. The purpose of this disjunction is to accommodate both views about 
the direction of fundamentality considered above. However, this won’t work, as there are views 
according to which properties are powers, and assuming that in-virtue-of relations are asymmetric, on 
such views, this modified version of BTV will not be adequate. Can we add yet another subclause to 
the right-hand side to accommodate this option? Perhaps we can, at the sacrifice of elegance. But this 
still wouldn’t address the first problem that in-virtue-of claims explain only so much.  
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this example. 
7 Assume that Fred is red but it doesn’t have any red proper parts. 
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The Modal Bearers Thesis (MBT): A property F has a causal power C if and only if, 
necessarily, all bearers of F have C. 
MBT doesn’t suffer from Fred-like counterexamples. However, the problem with MBT is that 
it presupposes a specific view about the relationship between properties and causal powers, 
and arguably about the modal status of laws of nature. Assuming that the strength of the 
modal operator in MBT is metaphysical necessity, MBT seems to require the truth of 
dispositionalism, according to which properties have their causal profiles as a matter of 
metaphysical necessity [Shoemaker 1980; Swoyer 1982; Bird 2007]. Dispositionalism, 
coupled with realism about laws of nature, implies that laws of nature hold with metaphysical 
necessity: if laws of nature govern the causal relationships that properties may enter into, then 
the impossibility of a property to change its causal profile across worlds suggests that laws of 
nature hold with metaphysically necessity. Dispositionalism contrasts with categoricalism, 
according to which no property is essentially dispositional [Armstrong 1997]. On this view, 
properties have their causal roles contingently, and this suggests that laws of nature hold only 
contingently. As far as my methodology in this paper is concerned, the explanation of what it 
is for a property to have a causal power shouldn’t presuppose any of these views. Hence, the 
search for a neutral explanation continues.  
We can modify MBT so that it accommodates either of the views mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. To do that, we can take the necessity in question to be nomological necessity: 
necessity as a matter of laws of nature. Note that this would leave open whether the actual 
laws of nature are contingent or not. If the actual laws are not contingent, then nomological 
necessity and metaphysical necessity would be equivalent, so this modification doesn’t rule 
out necessitarian views of laws of nature. However, if the actual laws are contingent, then 
nomological necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity, hence this modification would 
be required. 
According to the modified version, being red has the causal power to look red insofar as 
every bearer of being red in every nomologically possible world has the causal power to look 
red.8 More generally, I propose the following: 
The Nomic Bearers Thesis (NBT): A property F has a causal power C if and only if, as 
a matter of nomological necessity, all bearers of F have C. 
I propose NBT as a reductive thesis: it reduces a property’s causal powers to the causal 
powers of its bearers in nomologically possible worlds. If NBT is true, we have an 
explanation of what it is for a property to ‘confer’ a causal power on its bearers: conferring a 
power is a matter of there being (at least) a nomological necessity that anything that has the 
power-conferring property must have the conferred power. If the governing conception of 
laws of nature is true, then such nomological necessities will be ultimately grounded in laws, 
hence the relationship between properties and causal powers will be underwritten by laws. 
That said, NBT presupposes neither the reality of laws of nature nor a governing conception 
of laws, because there might be no laws and what we take to be nomologically necessary 
                                                 
8 In the case of this particular example, even if were to go outside the sphere of nomologically possible 
worlds, the result wouldn’t change, as it is arguably necessary that all red objects have the power to 
look red. On an understanding whereby colour properties are nothing over and above dispositions to 
generate colour experiences, this point becomes very clear. As with other issues, I remain neutral on 
this. 
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might just be necessary simpliciter. However, I anticipate that NBT will be closer to the 
hearts of those who wish to give laws of nature a central role in metaphysics. In any case, 
when responding to an objection in section 5 and presenting my main argument in section 6, I 
will presuppose a realist conception of laws of nature. 
I believe that NBT does the job it is supposed to do: it explains what it is for a property to 
have a causal power. In so doing, it doesn’t suffer from the problems that other versions of 
BT face. The case for NBT will become stronger once I respond to a foreseeable objection 
(section 5) and show its successful application to the issue of epiphenomenal properties 
(section 6). 
5. Nomologically Coextensional Properties 
One way of arguing against NBT follows the following strategy: find an example where all 
bearers of a property F have a given causal power as a matter of nomological necessity, and 
then stress that it is implausible that this power can be a power of F. This objection can be 
developed in various ways; here, I focus on one such way. 
Consider the case of nomologically coextensional properties. (Properties F and G are 
nomologically coextensional just in case it is a nomological necessity that all and only Fs are 
Gs.) If NBT is true, then two properties must have exactly the same causal powers if they are 
nomologically coextensional; however, there are some cases of nomological coextension 
where this leads to counterintuitive results. Or so goes the objection.9 
Nomological coextension is a very strong relation that can easily be underestimated, so it is 
difficult to find plausible examples of non-identical properties which are nevertheless 
nomologically coextensional. To get such an example, assume that the Wiedemann-Franz law 
actually holds,10 so electrical conductivity (EC) and thermal conductivity (TC) are 
proportional in metals. If these parameters are proportional, then we should expect that, for 
some range of values of EC, there is some range of values of TC that a metal must have if it 
has the former. So, some determinates of EC must be nomologically coextensional with some 
determinates of TC. Let’s say that EC1 and TC1 are two such determinate properties. So, as a 
matter of nomological necessity, all and only bearers of EC1 are also bearers of TC1. Assume 
that Jarvis — a piece of metal — has EC1 (and thereby has TC1). When Jarvis conducts 
electricity, it does so because of having EC1, not TC1. So, this manifested power to conduct 
electricity must be a power of EC1, not of TC1. NBT implies it must be a power of both of 
these properties. Therefore, the objection concludes, NBT should be rejected. 
In responding to this objection, we must consider what it is for a statement to be true as a 
matter of nomological necessity. Assuming a broadly realist position about laws of nature, I 
think it must be either a statement of a law of nature or a consequence of some laws of nature. 
                                                 
9 Nomological coextension is a case of nomological necessitation. Other versions of this objection 
involve cases of nomological necessitation. If everything has mass as a matter of nomological 
necessity, then will the causal powers of having mass be included in any property’s powers? I discuss 
a similar case at the end of section 6: the case of being nomologically possible, a property that is 
nomologically necessitated by any nomologically possible property. 
10 I am not qualified to have an authoritative opinion on this matter, but as far as I understand, this is 
actually not a law. I will assume otherwise for the sake of presenting this objection. 
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If it is either a law of nature or a consequence of some laws of nature that all bearers of TC1 
must be capable of conducting electricity, then it should be acceptable that TC1 has the power 
to conduct electricity. So, if it is indeed either a law of nature or a consequence of some laws 
of nature that EC1 and TC1 must be coextensional, then there should be nothing wrong with 
suggesting that these two determinate properties have identical powers. Pushing further and 
arguing that the exercised power in question is a power of EC1, not TC1, because Jarvis can 
manifest this power in virtue of EC1, not in virtue of TC1, would take us back to BTV, and in 
section 4, I have expressed my dissatisfaction with BTV.11  
Cases of nomological coextension are then clear examples where powers of different 
properties can be identical. This raises the question of whether properties are individuated by 
their causal powers. If there are non-identical properties that are nomologically coextensional, 
then, given NBT, the said individuation must fail. But since NBT is not committed to non-
identical but nomologically coextensional properties, NBT itself doesn’t imply the failure of 
individuation of properties by causal powers. 
In the next section, I will use NBT to derive an account of epiphenomenal properties and then 
argue that the relevant target properties in the special sciences are not epiphenomenal. 
6. Epiphenomenal Properties 
The issue that prompted me to explore what it is for a property to have some causal power is 
the problem of epiphenomenal properties in the special sciences. As clarified earlier, in the 
literal sense of ‘having’ a causal power, no property has a causal power. So, are all properties 
epiphenomenal? Surely, the issue of epiphenomenal properties must be more interesting than 
this. My first task here is to offer a more interesting account of epiphenomenal properties. 
Then I will argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal. 
In short, an epiphenomenal property is a property that doesn’t have any causal powers. 
According to NBT, the conditions under which a property may have a causal power are as 
follows: as a matter of nomological necessity, all bearers of that property must have that 
power. This gives us the following understanding of epiphenomenal properties: 
(EP) A property F is epiphenomenal if and only if there is no causal power C such 
that, as a matter of nomological necessity, all bearers of F have C. 
According to EP, if it is nomologically possible for different bearers of the same property to 
fail to share any causal powers, then that property is epiphenomenal. Having explained the 
locution of ‘power of a property’ in the way NBT does, this is how we should understand the 
locution of ‘property without a power’. If properties are to be somehow associated with sets 
of causal powers and an epiphenomenal property is to be associated with the empty set, then 
given NBT, epiphenomenal properties should understood along the lines of EP. 
                                                 
11 Admittedly, my reasons for finding BTV unsuccessful in section 4 weren’t demonstratively 
conclusive against BTV. There, I argued that BTV is either not explanatory enough or controversial. 
This doesn’t mean that BTV is false. At any rate, this objection is as powerful as the case for BTV, 
and I hope that the reader who finds BTV more promising than NBT can still find the latter 
sufficiently plausible to be worth seeing where it leads. 
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Now, if this is what an epiphenomenal property is, are the higher-level properties that are 
invoked in the special sciences epiphenomenal? In section 3, we saw Kim’s reasoning that if 
we are to resist the identification of higher-level properties with physical properties and still 
hold on to the causal closure of the physical, then, barring systematic causal 
overdetermination, higher-level properties must be epiphenomenal. The reason for resisting 
the identification of higher-level properties with the physical ones is that higher-level 
properties are multiply realizable by different physical properties [Putnam 1967]. That is, the 
very same higher-level property H could be instantiated by different objects in virtue of 
different physical properties, so H can’t be identified with any of these physical properties.  
Next, I want to show that such higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal even if they are 
not themselves physical properties. Although I accept the nomological possibility of multiple 
realization, I believe that the realization relation that is supposed to hold between a higher-
level property and its lower-level base properties puts some constraints on which properties 
could realize what others. In order to see this, we don’t need to endorse a particular theory of 
realization.12 We can understand ‘realization’ to refer to some dependence relation between 
higher-level properties and lower-level properties whereby the instantiations of the latter, 
together with the right background conditions, synchronically bring about the instantiations of 
the former, with (at least) nomological necessity. Whereas some lower-level properties are 
suitable to bring about certain higher-level properties, some are not. This point is nicely 
illustrated by Ned Block in a passage where he introduces what he calls ‘the Disney Principle’ 
[1997: 120]: 
In Walt Disney movies, teacups think and talk, but in the real world, anything 
that can do those things needs more structure than a teacup. We might call this 
the Disney Principle: … laws of nature impose constraints on ways of making 
something that satisfies a certain description. There may be many ways of 
making such a thing, but not just any old structure will do.  
How should we understand the constraints that laws impose on the satisfaction of a higher-
level description? First, like Block, I find it plausible that if laws impose constraints on how 
to satisfy a description, those that satisfy it are likely to have similarities, precisely because 
they meet those constraints [ibid.: 121]. As Block also points out, one (quite unsurprising) 
similarity among those that satisfy the description ‘is a thinker’ is similarity with respect to 
having a structure different from that of a teacup. From my armchair, I can’t tell you what the 
further constraints will be; but there will be more, and with each new constraint comes a new 
dimension along which the objects meeting those constraints are similar to one another. For 
example, any two objects that meet the description ‘aquatic mammal’ are likely to have more 
in common than at least some pair of objects that meet the description ‘mammal’ since the 
former have the property of being aquatic in common, and some pair that meets the latter will 
not.13 So, it seems fair to assume that the extent of similarity between two objects that satisfy 
the description ‘is a thinker’ will be greater than that of a teacup and a philosopher.14 Second, 
                                                 
12 See Polger [2004], Morris [2010], Baysan [2015] and Wilson [2015] for discussions of theories of 
realization. 
13 Thanks to Neil McDonnell for this example. 
14 As an anonymous referee points out, the possibility of disjunctive constraints raises a difficulty here. 
Suppose I authoritatively impose that anyone who is allowed in my house must wear either orange 
socks or a green hat. Call this rule ‘Socks-Hats’. Does imposing Socks-Hats guarantee any similarity 
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if the entities that are responsible for the satisfaction of a higher-level description (e.g., ‘is a 
vending machine’) are physical realizers of the higher-level property in question (e.g., being a 
vending machine), then similarities will be similarities of the physical properties that realize 
the higher-level property. Third, as far as properties with causal powers are concerned, 
similarities of properties will mirror the similarities of (at least some of) their causal powers 
(at least in worlds that are nomologically alike). These three observations suggest that 
different nomologically possible realizers of a given higher-level property will have 
similarities, to some extent, with respect to their causal powers. Thus, the Disney Principle 
leads me to suspect what I shall call realizer similarity (RS) is true: 
(RS) Different nomologically possible realizers of a higher-level property share some 
causal powers.15 
Before presenting my argument, there is one last point I should note about realization. If a 
property in the actual world is a higher-level property that requires a realizer (in order to be 
instantiated), then it requires a realizer in any nomologically possible world. In other words, it 
is not nomologically contingent for a property to be a realized property. Just to borrow an 
example from the philosophy of mind literature, if, in the actual world, being in pain is a 
higher-level property which can’t be instantiated unless its bearer instantiates some physical 
realizer of it, this is so in other nomologically possible worlds — i.e., there are no 
nomologically possible worlds in which being in pain is a fundamental property. So, realized 
properties (nomologically) require realizers in order to be instantiated. Call this realizer 
requirement (REQ).  
(REQ) If a property F is a realized property and S is the set of all nomologically 
possible realizers of F, then, as a matter of nomological necessity, any bearer of F is a 
bearer of some property from S. 
                                                 
among my guests (other than their guest-like features)? If not, the idea that constraints lead to 
similarities can be resisted. I think this difficulty can be overcome, at least in the case of natural laws. 
Either (i) there are disjunctive similarities or (ii) there are none. If (i), then there are reasons to think 
that there are disjunctive properties, so in the Socks-Hats case, my guests will be similar with respect 
to being orange-socked or green-hatted. Likewise, if natural laws impose disjunctive constraints, then 
this can lead to similarities with respect to disjunctive properties. If (ii), then there will be reasons to 
think that there are no disjunctive properties, in which case, we would expect natural laws not to 
impose disjunctive constraints. (On this option, any apparent disjunctive constraint in a law would 
have to be somehow explained away.) So, even if Socks-Hats imposes a disjunctive constraint, there 
are reasons to think that the analogy will not extend to the domain of natural laws. 
15 RS has a noteworthy implication: it rules out the nomological possibility of epiphenomenal realizers 
– i.e., epiphenomenal properties that realize other properties. For those who think that determinable 
properties are realized by their determinates (e.g., Shoemaker [2001] and Wilson [2009]), this 
indicates that no determinate property is epiphenomenal. The two cited authors here shouldn’t be 
worried about this, given their scepticism about epiphenomenal properties. But suppose we hold that 
there are epiphenomenal properties and some of them are determinates of determinable properties. 
Then we have two options: either reject that determinables are realized by their determinates 
[Funkhouser 2006], or hold that determinables are realized by their determinates only when the 
determinates are not epiphenomenal. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this 
implication. 
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Now I can present the argument that physically realized higher-level properties are not 
epiphenomenal. Suppose: 
(1) H is a higher-level property and S is the (non-empty) set of physical properties that 
realize H.  
From RS and (1), we have the following: 
(2) There is some causal power C1 such that any member of S has C1.  
From REQ and (1), we get: 
(3) As a matter of nomological necessity, any bearer of H has some property from S. 
Now recall NBT; from NBT and (2), we have the following result: 
(4) As a matter of nomological necessity, any bearer of any property from S has C1. 
From (3) and (4), we get: 
(5) As a matter of nomological necessity, any bearer of H has C1. 
Using existential generalisation on (5), we have: 
(6) There is some causal power C such that, as a matter of nomological necessity, any 
bearer of H has C. 
If EP is true, from (6) we get the following conclusion: 
(7) H is not an epiphenomenal property.  
This conclusion generalises from H to all physically realized higher-level properties. EP says 
that a property is epiphenomenal insofar as there is no causal power whose possession is 
nomologically necessitated by having that property. I have argued that whenever a given 
higher-level property is realized, there is at least one causal power that is had by all of its 
realizer properties, and thereby had by all of its bearers, as a matter of nomological necessity. 
So, for any physically realized higher-level property, there is some causal power that is 
nomologically necessitated by having that property. Therefore, no physically realized higher-
level property is epiphenomenal. This shows that a higher-level property needn’t be type-
identified with what appears to be its physical realizer to save its causal efficacy. Whether 
Kim’s opponents (i.e., non-reductive physicalists) will find this solution ‘non-reductive’ 
enough to take it on board remains to be seen. For what it is worth, the argument shows that 
multiply realized higher-level properties have causal efficacy.  
Before closing, let me mention a worry that one might raise in response to the argument just 
presented. The conclusion seems to generalise from physically realized higher-level properties 
to any property of any nomologically possible concrete particular. Being nomologically 
possible will put some constraints which will be reflected in some causal powers (for example 
those powers we would associate with having mass), and therefore there will be causal 
powers that are shared by any bearer of any property, as a matter of nomological necessity. 
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Then no property of a nomologically possible concrete particular will be epiphenomenal. The 
worry is that my argument appears to overgeneralise. Even if one wants to dispense with 
epiphenomenal properties, this is not the right way of doing so. For example, philosophers of 
mind will not be content that being in pain is non-epiphenomenal just because it 
nomologically necessitates having some causal powers that are associated with having mass. 
In response to this worry, we can treat some powers of properties as second-class and hold 
that having only second-class powers doesn’t make a property non-epiphenomenal. Powers 
that are not-second class powers will be first-class powers. Powers that are had by all 
nomologically possible concrete particulars can be counted as second-class powers; they 
don’t indicate any privileges because anything has them. An implication of this is that the 
property of being nomologically possible may count as epiphenomenal because it will not 
have any power which is not second-class. We should expect the same for properties like 
being a physical object and even having mass, but arguably not for their determinates. But 
this is a fair price to pay; after all, these are in no way distinctive properties; but their 
determinates are. 
This response has a desirable consequence: ‘wildly’ disjunctive properties, namely those 
disjunctive properties whose disjuncts have no first-class powers in common, may be 
epiphenomenal. Consider the disjunctive property being red or being non-red. The only 
causal powers its disjuncts (being red and being non-red) have in common are second-class 
powers. This is in fact reminiscent of Armstrong’s [1989: 82-83] argument that there are no 
disjunctive properties because if there were, then there would be no guarantee that their 
instances resemble each other. Whereas that argument mistakes all disjunctive properties to 
be wildly disjunctive, what I have said does not.16 Once we separate wildly disjunctive 
properties from those that are non-wildly disjunctive, we can even have some grounds to 
argue that the former can be eliminated without thereby touching the latter. 
7. Conclusion 
I investigated what it is for a property to have some causal power, and motivated the view that 
a property has a causal power if and only if it is nomologically necessitated that all bearers of 
that property have that power. This clarifies what it is for a property not to have any causal 
power. So, I took an epiphenomenal property to be a property whose instantiation doesn’t 
nomologically necessitate having some given causal power. I argued that this way of 
understanding epiphenomenal properties shows that physically realized higher-level 
properties are not epiphenomenal, thanks to the further observation that laws of nature impose 
causal similarities on the bearers of such properties; these similarities figure as powers in the 
causal profiles of these properties, which makes such properties non-epiphenomenal by this 
paper’s rights.17 
                                                 
16 See also Clapp [2001] and Antony [2003] for arguments that disjunctive properties don’t have to be 
wildly disjunctive.  
17 Many thanks to Katherine Baysan, Jonas Christensen, John Donaldson, Stephan Leuenberger, James 
Miller and two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments on previous versions of 
this paper. Discussions of various points with Alex Carruth, David Glick, David Mark Kovacs, Anna 
Marmodoro, Neil McDonnell, Martin Pickup, Matthew Tugby and Nathan Wildman have been 
helpful. The work for this paper was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The 
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